Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes
Michael L. Traverst
As the scope of criminal law has expanded over the last
hundred years, one of its basic premises has been gradually and
subtly eroded: it is no longer realistic to presume that every
person knows the law. The criminalization of ostensibly innocent
behavior has created situations in which people may be convicted
of serious crimes without having had any idea they were doing
something illegal. Simply knowing the dictates of a statute is not
enough: one must also understand the nuances of its judicial
interpretation to know precisely where the boundary between
criminal and noncriminal behavior lies. These circumstances
have weakened the basis for the traditional background rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse.'
Responding to this situation, federal courts in recent years
have carved out exceptions to this background rule, holding that
for particular crimes a defendant cannot be convicted unless he
knew that his conduct was illegal.2 Although the majority of the
cases creating these exceptions involve federal mala prohibita3
crimes requiring willfulness as the mens rea for violation, the
reasoning behind these exceptions extends to other levels of mens
rea as well. The most recent decision in this series is Ratzlaf v
United States, in which the Supreme Court interpreted the word
"willfully" in a federal money laundering statute to require that
the government prove knowledge of illegality as an element of
the offense.4
t B.S. 1993, Virginia Polytechnic Institute; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of
Chicago.
See, for example, Barlow v United States, 32 US 404, 411 (1833); Shevlin-Carpenter
Co. v Minnesota, 218 US 57, 68 (1910).
2 See, for example, Liparota v United States, 471 US 419 (1985) (requiring knowledge of illegality for conviction of unlawful acquisition and possession of food stamps);
Cheek v United States, 498 US 192 (1991) (requiring knowledge of illegality for conviction
of willful tax evasion).
' Mala prohibita ("wrongs that are prohibited") criminal offenses proscribe conduct
that is wrongful simply because a legislature has chosen to criminalize it; examples of
such crimes include speeding and disposing of hazardous waste without the appropriate
permit. In contrast, mala in se ("wrongs in themselves") crimes are those that traditionally have been regarded as inherently evil; examples include rape and larceny.
4 114 S Ct 655, 658 (1994).
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Taken collectively, these decisions create a logical framework
in which mistake of law5 should be a viable defense--that is,
accepted as exculpatory-to all mala prohibita crimes requiring a
mens rea of recklessness or higher.7 Ratzlaf in particular has
significant implications for other criminal statutes that require
willfulness, and may signal a broader change in courts' previous
reluctance to consider motive in determining whether an individual has committed a crime. Ratzlaf's rationale arguably
creates a mistake of law defense for criminal violations of federal
banking laws, firearms regulations, and other crimes that are
not, in Justice Ginsburg's words, "obviously 'evil' or inherently
'bad."'" Though the lower federal courts could easily have limited
Ratzlaf to its facts, many have instead extended the Supreme
Court's interpretation of "willfully" to other mala prohibita
offenses, reaching a result to which it appears they may have
been predisposed.9
This Comment argues that, in the absence of a clear legislative command to the contrary, mistake of law should be a defense
to all mala prohibita crimes that require a mens rea of recklessness or higher for violation. Part I summarizes the series of
recent cases that have expanded the mistake of law defense and
attempts to outline its current status in federal criminal law.
Part II analyzes mistake of law on a theoretical level and argues

s In this Comment, the term "mistake of law" refers to mistakes of penal law, which
traditionally have not exculpated criminal defendants. In contrast, courts recognize that a
mistake of law other than that defining the offense sometimes will exculpate, as where a
defendant admits knowledge of the larceny statute he is accused of violating but asserts
that a misinterpretation of property law led him to believe the allegedly stolen item was
his. See, for example, United States v Freed, 401 US 601, 615-16 (1971) (Brennan concurring); United States v Golitscheck, 808 F2d 195, 202-03 (2d Cir 1986). In such cases, the
mistake about "other law" negates the mens rea required for the crime.
' It is technically inaccurate to refer to mistake of law as a "defense" because when a
court accepts mistake of law as potentially exculpating a defendant, knowledge of illegality becomes an element of the crime that the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. Mistake of law is thus not an affirmative defense in its own right but simply adds
an element to the prosecution's case-in-chief. Because the opinions and academic writings
on this subject generally refer to mistake of law as a defense, however, this Comment will
also refer to it as such.
' The levels of mens rea higher than recklessness include knowledge, willfulness, intent, and purpose. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries §
2.02 (1985).
8 Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 662.
' See, for example, United States v Curran, 20 F3d 560, 570 (3d Cir 1994) (requiring
knowledge of illegality for conviction of willfully causing election officials to submit false
reports to the Federal Election Commission); United States v Obiechie, 38 F3d 309, 310
(7th Cir 1994) (requiring knowledge of illegality for conviction of willfully dealing in firearms without a license).
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that concerns of lenity, moral culpability, and due process justify
the expansion of this defense. Part III outlines a proposal for the
mistake of law defense that limits its applicability to a relatively
narrow class of offenses and provides examples of how criminal
statutes would be interpreted under this new approach.

I. THE EVOLUTION OF TE MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE
A. The Pre-RatzlafCase Law
At common law, criminal defendants who asserted a mistake
of law defense had a formidable obstacle to overcome: the familiar maxim ignorantialegis neminem excusat, meaning "ignorance
of the law excuses no one."' ° Oliver Wendell Holmes's approach
typified the traditional common law position: "[E]very one must
feel that ignorance of the law could never be admitted as an
excuse, even if the fact could be proved by sight and hearing in
every case."" Early theorists justified the rule's inflexibility by
asserting that the law was "definite and knowable."' Though
now clearly a fiction, 3 the common law presumption that every
person knows the law bears primary responsibility for the
doctrine's inveteracy in our criminal jurisprudence. 4
Over the last century, however, American criminal law has
gradually shifted away from the position that mistake of law is
never a defense, and a number of exceptions to this general rule
have evolved. 5 The first major incursion against the common

See, for example, Barlow v United States, 32 US 404, 411 (1833).
n Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 48 (Little, Brown, 1881). See also
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in American Surety Co. of New York v Sullivan, 7 F2d 605,
606 (2d Cir 1925) ("The word 'willful,' even in criminal statutes, means no more than that
the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing. It does not mean that, in
addition, he must suppose that he is breaking the law.").
" John Austin, 1 Lectures on Jurisprudence497 (John Murray, 3d ed 1869), translating Pandects, Digest xxii 6, 2. See also William M. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *27
(1854). Although this statement seems facetious in our modem regulatory state, it was
substantially accurate until about two hundred years ago. The early criminal law was
closely intertwined with the mores and customs of medieval England, which is no longer
the case with regard to mala prohibita crimes. See Livingston Hall and Selig J. Seligman,
Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U Chi L Rev 641, 644 (1941).
" Jerome Hall, General Principlesof CriminalLaw 376 (Bobbs-Merrill, 2d ed 1960).
14 See Lambert v California,355 US 225, 228 (1957) (noting that the traditional rule
regarding ignorance "is deep in our law").
" Compare Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v Minnesota, 218 US 57, 68 (1910) (asserting
broadly that "ignorance of the law will not excuse"), with Cheek v United States, 498 US
192, 200 (1991) (noting that exceptions have "softened the impact of the common-law
presumption" that mistake of law does not excuse). See also American Law Institute,
Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.02 comment 11 (Tentative Draft No 4, 1955) ("It
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law rule occurred in a 1933 case, United States v Murdock, in

which the defendant had been charged with willful failure to
supply certain information about deductions on his income tax returns. 16 Prior to that time, the term "willfully" had generally
been interpreted to mean "knowingly and voluntarily," without
regard for the actor's awareness of a legal duty.' The Murdock
Court, in contrast, interpreted "willfully" to mean "an act done
with a bad purpose" or "evil motive" and reversed the conviction. 8 Congress, the Court reasoned, did not intend that a person should become a criminal by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding of the tax laws, especially in light of their complexity. 9
Consequently, Murdock was entitled to a jury instruction on
whether he had acted in good faith based on his actual beliefs
about what the law required."
Murdock marked the birth of the "tax crimes" exception to
the general rule on mistake of law, an exception courts have sustained and refined during the last sixty years.2 ' In Cheek v United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this exception, holding
that evidence of any belief-no matter how objectively unreasonable--could be introduced to show that the defendant was ignorant of his legal duties under the tax laws.22 Until very recently,
however, attempts to expand this exception beyond tax crimes
and into other areas of federal criminal law were universally
unsuccessful.23 The line of cases interpreting "willfully" in the
should be noted that the general principle that ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse is
usually greatly overstated.... ."). Of course, mistake of law has always been a valid
defense where the legislature has clearly made knowledge of illegality an element of the
crime. See, for example, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 USC § 78ff(a) (Supp
1993) (lack of knowledge of the relevant regulations is an affirmative defense to certain
securities crimes); 18 USC § 922(f)(1) (1988) (crime of transporting firearms in interstate
commerce requires knowledge that such transportation is illegal); id § 1902 (1988) (offense
of buying and selling of agricultural commodities by government officials requires actual
knowledge of the rules prohibiting such conduct).
16 290 US 389 (1933), overruled on other grounds, Murphy v Waterfront Comm'n, 378
US 52 (1964). Specifically, the defendant had been charged with violations of the Revenue
Act of 1926 §§ 256, 1114(a), amended by Internal Revenue Code of 1954 §§ 7201-12,
presently codified at 26 USC §§ 1023, 2148, 1265 (1988). 290 US at 391-92.
" See, for example, New York Central & H.R.R. Co. v United States, 165 F 833, 841
(1st Cir 1908).
'8 290 US at 394-95.
19 Id at 396.
20

Id.

21 See, for example, United States v Bishop, 412 US 346, 360 (1973) (within criminal

tax statutes, "willfully" connotes a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty"); United States v Pomponio, 429 US 10, 11 (1976) (willful violation requires a specific intent to violate the law).
2 498 US 192, 203 (1991).
' See United States v Caming, 968 F2d 232, 240-41 (2d Cir 1992) (collecting cases
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Internal Revenue Code thus delineated a narrow exception to the
mistake of law rule, which the Supreme Court made great effort
to limit to tax crimes. 24
Nonetheless, courts have recently expanded the mistake of
law defense beyond the tax offense context. In Liparota v United
States,2 5 the defendant was charged with violating a federal
statute which provided that "whoever knowingly uses, transfers,
acquires, alters, or possesses [food stamps] ...in any manner
not authorized by... the regulations" shall be guilty of a criminal offense.26 At issue was whether the word "knowingly" modified only the series of verbs immediately following it, or whether it extended further and also modified the phrase "in any manner not authorized." The difference is crucial: Under the first
interpretation, a defendant fulfills the mens rea requirement of
the offense if he is aware of what he is doing when he undertakes the prohibited transaction. The second interpretation, however, requires that the defendant know his conduct is illegal.
The Liparota Court chose the second interpretation, holding
that "to interpret the statute otherwise would be to criminalize a
broad range of apparently innocent conduct."2 7 Although the majority was careful to assert that it was not creating a mistake of
law defense,28 the opinion almost certainly does precisely that,
at least within the context of the specific statute at issue." The
Liparota Court relied not only on the statutory text in reaching
its decision, but also on the presumption that criminal offenses
require a mens rea," the harshness of criminalizing actions that
inadvertently violate the law,3 and the rule of lenity.3 2

refusing to extend Cheek beyond tax crime context). See also United States v Dashney, 937
F2d 532, 540 (10th Cir 1991) (declining to extend Cheek to currency reporting crimes);
United States v Lorenzo, 995 F2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir 1993), cert denied, 114 S Ct 225
(1993), reh'g denied, 114 S Ct 589 (1993) (refusing to extend Cheek to crime of making
false statement to government official).
24 See United States v Aversa, 984 F2d 493, 500 (1st Cir 1993) ("This repeated qualification makes clear that the Court has crafted a narrow exception, limited to tax cases

471 US 419 (1985).
26
'

7 USC § 2024(b)(1) (1988).
471 US at 426.
Idat 425 n 9.
See Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 Colum L Rev 1392, 1399-1400

(1986).

471 US at 425-26.

31 Id at 426-27.
22

Id at 427-28. For a discussion of the rule of lenity, see text accompanying notes

105-08. See also Rewis v United States, 401 US 808, 812 (1971); United States v United
States Gypsum Co., 438 US 422, 437 (1978).
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There was no disagreement within the Liparota Court that
the word "knowingly" at least applied to the statutory phrase
"uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses."3 3 That is, the
statute did contain a mens rea requirement with regard to the
defendant's physical conduct. Therefore, the Court must have
meant that a mens rea regarding the defendant's awareness of a
legal duty is to be inferred in every case when the Court stated
that "the failure of Congress explicitly and unambiguously to
indicate whether mens rea is required does not signal a departure"34 from the general rule that criminal offenses do require
mens rea. Taken literally, this implies that mistake of law should
be a defense to any crime in which the statuory text does not
specifically exclude it: if even a minimal mens rea of negligence
were read into such a crime, mistake of law would have to be
accepted as a defense for reasonable mistakes. But the Liparota
Court could not possibly have meant to sweep away centuries of
jurisprudence by implication. The extreme breadth of this proposition illustrates the need for a clear delineation of the limits of
the mistake of law defense.
B. Ratzlaf v United States
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Ratzlaf v United
States may represent the most significant inroad against the
common law mistake of law rule. By holding that willful violations of certain federal money laundering statutes require knowledge of illegality,35 the Supreme Court not only fundamentally
altered the legal requirements of these provisions, but also set
forth a standard of statutory interpretation that reaches beyond
money laundering to other criminal offenses.
The specific statutory provisions at issue in Ratzlaf were a
complex set of regulations collectively known as the "antistructuring" statutes." These provisions authorize the Secretary of
the Treasury to require that certain monetary transactions be
reported to the IRS. In particular, 31 USC § 5313 requires domestic financial institutions to report cash transactions above

See Liparota, 471 US at 435 (White dissenting).
34

Id at 426.

114 S Ct at 663.
See Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (Bank Secrecy Act of 1970),
31 USCA §§ 5311-25 (West 1983 & Supp 1994), amended by Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 § 411, Pub L No 103-325, 108 Stat 2160,
2253.
"
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$10,000." A separate provision, 31 USC § 5324, makes it unlawful to structure one's transactions with the purpose of evading
this reporting requirement." For example, one may not make a
series of five $9,000 cash deposits rather than a single $45,000
deposit in order to avoid having a report sent. At the time
Ratzlaf was decided, 31 USC § 5322(a) set forth criminal penalties for persons "willfully violating" other antistructuring provisions, including up to five years in federal prison.3 9
Waldemar Ratzlaf was a gambler who, in a single evening,
ran up a $160,000 debt playing blackjack at a Nevada casino.
When Ratzlaf attempted to pay his debt in cash, the casino informed him that the transaction would have to be reported to the
federal government because it was in excess of $10,000.40 In
order to circumvent the reporting requirement, Ratzlaf attempted
to pay his debt with a series of cashier's checks, each from a
different bank and in an amount slightly less than $10,000.41
On the basis of these transactions, Ratzlaf was charged with
violating 31 USC §§ 5322(a) and 5324. Although there was virtually no dispute at trial that Ratzlaf knew he was structuring
transactions, the defense argued that he had not known that
structuring was illegal. To satisfy the willfulness requirement of
§ 5322(a), the defense contended, the government needed to
prove that Ratzlaf actually knew structuring was illegal when he
made the transactions.42 Ratzlaf was convicted after the district

'
See 31 USC § 5313 (1988). See also 31 CFR § 103.22(a)(2) (1994) (setting threshold
amount to trigger reporting requirement at $10,000). Other provisions in the
antistructuring statutes impose similar reporting requirements on different types of cash
transactions. See, for example, 31 USC § 5314 (1988) (monetary transactions with foreign
financial agencies); id § 5316 (1988) (international transportation of United States currency).
See 31 USC § 5324 (1988).
See id §§ 5322(a), 5324 (1988). In response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Ratzlaf,Congress removed the willfulness requirement from the antistructuring statutes.
See Community Development Banking Act of 1994, HR Rep No 103-652, 103d Cong, 2d
Sess 98 (1994). Consequently, the government need no longer prove knowledge of illegality to secure a structuring conviction; the mens rea requirement for this offense can now
be met simply by showing an intent to evade the currency transaction reporting requirements. See id; 31 USCA §§ 5322, 5324 (West Supp 1994). Although changes to the
antistructuring statutes have thus superseded Ratzlaf's specific holding, the Court's rationale and reasoning retain their broader precedential value.
40 Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 657. Casinos are considered "financial institutions" for purposes of the antistructuring statutes, and are thus subject to the reporting requirements.
31 CFR § 103.11(i)(7)(i) (1994).
4 The casino graciously provided Ratzlaf with a limousine and placed one of its
employees at his disposal to help him purchase the checks. Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 657.
42

Id.
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judge ruled that knowledge of illegality was not an element of
structuring and instructed the jury accordingly.43 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the defense's argument that it should
interpret "willfully" under the standard set forth in Cheek and
instead equating willfulness with mere knowledge of the reporting requirements."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the failure to
differentiate knowledge of illegality from mere knowledge of the
requirements "treat[s] § 5322(a)'s 'willfulness' requirement essentially as surplusage-as words of no consequence."4 5 While acknowledging that the meaning of "willful" is generally ambiguous
and context dependent, the Court nonetheless found the text of
the antistructuring statutes clear and therefore refused to consult their legislative history.4 6 Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion instead rested on two principal arguments: that "willfully"
read in the context of the antistructuring statutes must necessarily include knowledge of illegality, and that structuring is not so
inherently bad as to permit an inference of willfulness whenever
it occurs.
First, the Court noted that § 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement had to be interpreted in light of the way it had been applied to two other provisions of the antistructuring statutes: one
which requires the filing of reports for monetary transactions
with foreign financial agencies, and another which requires reports on transportation of currency across U.S. borders.47 Because § 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement had always been interpreted to include knowledge of illegality when applied to these
provisions, to avoid inconsistency it had to be similarly interpreted when applied to 31 USC § 5313.48 The Court reasoned that
just as a single term appearing multiple times in a statute
should be interpreted consistently, the word "willfully" in §

43
4

Id.
United States v Ratzlaf, 976 F2d 1280, 1287 (1992).

4' Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 659.
46 Id at 659, 662-63.
41 Id at 659.

As examples of § 5322(a)'s application to other antistructuring provisions, the
Court cited United States v Sturman, 951 F2d 1466, 1476-77 (6th Cir 1991) (holding that
"willful violation" of § 5314 requires knowledge of illegality), and United States v Warren,
612 F2d 887, 890 (5th Cir 1980) (finding that "willful violation" of § 5316 requires the
defendant to have "intentionally violated [a] known legal duty"). Ratzaf, 114 S Ct at 65960.
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5322(a) must
be construed "the same way each time it is called
49
into play."
Second, the Court held that currency structuring is not the
sort of "inevitably nefarious" behavior that by its very nature
evinces a purpose to do wrong and thereby demonstrates willfulness. ° For example, one could structure transactions to avoid
having reports sent with the innocent purpose of reducing the
likelihood of a burglary or an IRS audit."' Indeed, there is nothing inherently wrong with adapting and adjusting one's transactions to avoid the impact of a particular government regulation
or tax; such behavior is in fact quite common in tax and estate
planning contexts.5 2
In addition to these two principal bases for its decision, the
Court also noted that even if § 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement
had been ambiguous, the rule of lenity would have mandated
that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant." Although lenity did not play a direct role in Ratzlaf, the Court's
discussion of it has significant implications for future cases. Lower courts are often hesitant to apply the rule,5 4 and some scholars have even suggested that it be dispensed with altogether.5 5
That the Ratzlaf Court went out of its way to assert the rule's
potential applicability, however, strongly supports the use of
lenity in interpreting criminal statutes that employ ambiguous
incarnations of the word "willful" or its grammatical variants.
Finally, the Ratzlaf Court carefully noted that its decision
did not alter the background rule "that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge."56 By using the word
"willfully," the Court reasoned, Congress has signified that the
government must prove knowledge of illegality in prosecutions
for currency structuring." That rationale effectively limits the
scope of the Court's decision and forecloses the argument that the

"' Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 660.

r Id at 660-61.
51

Id at 661.

52

Id.

Id at 662-63.
See, for example, United States v Anderson, 39 F3d 331, 356-57 (DC Cir 1994)
(insisting that federal firearms statute had clear meaning and refusing to apply rule of
lenity even though other courts had disagreed as to the statute's interpretation).
See, for example, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries §
1.02(3) (1985). See also Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 5.04 at 30
(Matthew Bender, 1987).
114 S Ct at 663.
57 Id.
5
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opinion has opened the floodgates to a mistake of law defense for
all crimes. But it does not explain why Ratzlaf's reasoning cannot be applied to any other crime requiring willfulness as the
mens rea for violation.
That possibility seemed to lurk beneath the surface of Justice Blackmun's dissent. 8 Blackmun argued that the Ninth
Circuit's view did not render § 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement
surplusage because § 5322(a) applies to all provisions of the
antistructuring statutes, including some that do not require
knowledge of the reporting requirements.5 9 The majority's view
that willfulness includes "actual knowledge," said the dissent,
"strays from... our precedents interpreting criminal statutes
generally and 'willfulness' in particular."" Moreover, Blackmun
asserted, the majority's interpretation of "willfully" made prosecution under the antistructuring statutes substantially more
difficult and left those who formerly would have been convicted
"laughing all the way to the bank."6
The implication of the dissent's view, however, is that no
significant problem arises from reading § 5322(a) one way as
applied to § 5324 and an entirely different way as applied to
other antistructuring provisions. Under this interpretation, "willfully violates" would have a different meaning not only for different statutes, but also for different fact patterns arising under the
same statute. For example, 31 USC § 5316 requires the filing of a
report when more than $10,000 in cash is transported into or out
of the U.S.; § 5324 prohibits structuring to avoid this requirement. The dissent would read the "willfully violates" language of
§ 5322(a) as requiring knowledge of illegality for structuring
movements of currency into or out of the U.S., but as not requiring such knowledge for structuring currency transactions at a
financial institution. This approach would leave citizens guessing
as to the requirements of similarly worded statutes that the
courts had not yet interpreted. By equating willfulness with
knowledge of the reporting requirements, this view also effectively collapses two levels of mens rea into one.

's Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Thomas.
' Id at 665 (Blackmun dissenting). This argument tacitly concedes, however, that
under the dissent's interpretation, § 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement would be surplusage as applied to § 5324.
60

61

Id.
Id at 669-70.
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C. Post-Ratzlaf cases
Ratzlaf overruled the decisions of ten of the eleven circuit
courts of appeals that had interpreted § 5322(a)'s willfulness
requirement, necessitating reversal of virtually every structuring
case in the federal court system at that time. 2 Of far greater
significance, however, are a number of recent decisions that extend Ratzlaf's reasoning to statutes other than the
antistructuring provisions. This extension is noteworthy because
courts could have easily read Ratzlaf narrowly and limited it to
its facts. The Ratzlaf majority took great pains to indicate that it
was not creating a universal new definition of willfulness, calling
"willful" a "word of many meanings," the construction of which is
often "influenced by its context."6 3 The Court also rested its decision in part on the fact that lower courts had uniformly interpreted "willfully" to require knowledge of illegality as applied in
other antistructuring provisions -- a rationale that does not
necessarily carry over to other statutes. Finally, the Court
specifically stated that it was leaving intact the traditional background rule concerning ignorance of the law.6 5 Although each of
these limitations in the decision could independently justify a
refusal to extend Ratzlaf's reasoning beyond 31 USC § 5322(a), a
number of lower federal courts have nonetheless already extended it.
The best example of such an extension is United States v
Curran,which held that mistake of law is a defense to the crime
of willfully causing campaign treasurers to submit false reports
to the Federal Election Commission ("FEC").6 6 In that case, the
defendant asked his employees to make donations to the campaign funds of various candidates for political offices. Curran
then reimbursed the employees for these donations, thereby exceeding the $1,000 limitation on contributions to individual candidates for federal office. Curran was charged with and convicted
of three counts of causing false reports to be filed with the FEC,
in violation of 18 USC §§ 2(b) and 1001.7

' See id at 665 & n 3. At the time Ratzlaf was decided, only the First Circuit had
adopted an interpretation of "willfully" that required an instruction on knowledge of
illegality. See United States v Aversa, 984 F2d 493, 502 (1st Cir 1993) (en banc), vacated
and remanded, Donovan v United States, 114 S Ct 873 (1994).
114 S Ct at 659, quoting Spies v United States, 317 US 492, 497 (1943).
114 S Ct at 659-60.
Id at 663.
20 F3d 560, 569 (3d Cir 1994).
Id at 563. These statutes are not specific to election offenses. 18 USC § 2(b) (1988)
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On appeal, Curran argued that the "knowingly and willfully"
language of § 1001 required the government to prove two separate facts to secure a conviction: that he knew the campaign
treasurers had a legal duty to file accurate reports with the FEC,
and that his actions were undertaken with both knowledge of
illegality and the specific intent of causing the treasurers to submit inaccurate reports. 6 The Third Circuit agreed, analogizing
the case to Ratzlaf and reasoning that three significant similarities between the Election Campaign Act and the antistructuring
statutes dictated a similar result: first, the Election Campaign
Act imposes disclosure obligations that parallel the reporting
requirements of the antistructuring statutes; second, the conduct
criminalized in both statutes is not inherently bad or evil; and
third, both sets of provisions are "regulatory."69 Particularly
noteworthy was the Currancourt's statement that it found "nothing in [Ratzlaf's] discussion of willfulness that would confine the
rationale to the currency reporting statute."" The court asserted
that in this respect Ratzlaf was unlike Cheek, which had been
"carefully limited... to circumstances governed by the complexities of the Internal Revenue Code."7 '
Yet Curran does not track Ratzlaf as closely as it purports.
Although both courts interpreted willfulness similarly, the only
basis for decision that the cases truly shared is the second similarity noted in Curran,that the conduct at issue is not "obviously
'evil' or inherently 'bad."'72 The first similarity, that both statutes impose reporting or disclosure requirements, was not relied
upon in Ratzlaf. And the third similarity-that the statute at
issue is "regulatory"---is really just a restatement of the second
similarity, that the proscribed conduct is not inherently bad.
Moreover, Curran,unlike Ratzlaf, did not suggest that the "willfulness" language of the statute would be surplusage if it did not
include knowledge of illegality. The Curran court's failure to use
such reasoning, which it certainly could have used given the text
of § 1001, indicates that a potential surplusage problem is not a

makes it an offense to deliberately cause another person to perform an act that would violate federal criminal law. 18 USC § 1001 (1988) prohibits making false statements to
federal officials and provides that '[whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies... any false
writing or document... shall be fined... or imprisoned...."
' Curran, 20 F3d at 566-67.
6 Id.
70 Id at 568.
71

Id at 568-69.
See Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 662; Curran, 20 F3d at 569.
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necessary precondition to finding that willfulness requires knowledge of illegality.
In United States v Obiechie, the Seventh Circuit also extended Ratzlaf's reasoning, holding that the government must prove
knowledge of illegality to secure a conviction under certain federal firearms statutes.7 3 In Obiechie, the defendant was charged
with dealing in firearms without a license.7 4 The court interpreted the mens rea requirement of the statute in light of Ratzlaf,
holding that "willfully" must encompass knowledge of illegality
for it to be anything other than duplicative of the term "knowingly," which appeared elsewhere in the statutory language.7 5 Far
from believing that Ratzlaf should be confined to its facts, the
Obiechie court stated that it had a "duty under Ratzlaf" to interpret "willfulness" by considering "the context of the term's use
within the overall structure of the statute."76
Obiechie follows Ratzlafs reasoning closely. In both cases,
the courts ignored legislative history that they perceived to be
inconclusive or ambiguous in favor of an analysis of statutory
text.7 7 Similarly, both courts reasoned that unless willfulness
were interpreted to include knowledge of illegality, it would be
meaningless or redundant. 78 But the courts part ways over
whether the conduct at issue was so "inevitably nefarious" as to
be inherently willful. This argument could just as easily be made
for the crime of dealing in firearms without the appropriate icense as for the crime of structuring currency transactions, and
the Obiechie court's omission of the argument indicates that it is
not a prerequisite to finding that knowledge of illegality is required.

38 F3d 309, 310 (7th Cir 1994).
7 Id. The indictment specifically charged violations of two provisions of the Firearm
Owners' Protection Act of 1986: 18 USC § 922(a)(1)(A) (1988), which makes it unlawful
"for any person except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to
engage in the business of... dealing in firearms... ."; and 18 USC § 924(a)(1)(D), which
describes the mens rea requirement for violations of § 922(a)(1)(A) and provides that
"[whoever] willfully violates any other provision of this chapter, shall be fined not more
than $5,000, imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
75 38 F3d at 313-15. See, for example, 18 USC § 924(a)(1)(C) (1988) ("[whoever]
knowingly imports or brings into the United States... any firearm").
38 F3d at 313-14.
Compare Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 662 ("W]e do not resort to legislative history to
cloud a statutory text that is clear."), with Obiechie, 38 F3d at 313 ("The conflicting signals sent by FOPA's legislative history are of lesser importance....").
7 Compare Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 659 (willfulness must include knowledge of illegality
if it is to have any meaning), with Obiechie, 38 F3d at 315 (the difference between willingly and knowingly violating the statute is knowledge of illegality).
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In United States v Rogers, the Fourth Circuit also extended
Ratzlaf beyond its immediate context, applying it to an
antistructuring statute that was not addressed in the Supreme
Court's decision. 9 Rogers concerned the willfulness requirement
of 26 USC § 7203,80 which imposes criminal penalties for evading a requirement that businesses report to the IRS cash payments in excess of $10,000.81 With scant discussion of why
Ratzlaf's holding should or should not apply to a separate statute, the Rogers court simply concluded that under Ratzlaf, "the
failure to instruct on the defendant's knowledge of illegality of
his own conduct [was] an erroneous omission of an essential
element of the offense charged .... 82
Although the trend is clearly to expand the mistake of law
defense, a few courts have refused to apply Ratzlaf's reasoning
beyond the antistructuring statutes. 3 Courts have distinguished
Ratzlaf by citing textual variations in the statutes involved,"
differences in the nature of the offenses,85 or the still widely
held view that "willfully" means nothing more than knowingly
and voluntarily.8 6 Some of these decisions are clearly correct:
Ratzlaf's reasoning does not apply to every criminal statute, and
when the statutory provisions at issue are markedly different, it
is properly distinguished. Others, however, ignore both the implications of Ratzlaf and more fundamental justifications for expanding the mistake of law defense.
79 18 F3d 265, 267 (4th Cir 1994).
81

26 USC § 7203 (1988 & Supp 1993).
See 26 USc § 60501 (1988). This statutory scheme is similar to the antistructuring

statutes considered in Ratzlaf, but has a broader scope because it applies to any "trade or
business" rather than just financial institutions. Id.
'2 18 F3d at 268. In United States v Langley, 1994 WL 518394 (4th Cir), a panel of
the Fourth Circuit tacitly agreed with the Obiechie court, applying Ratzlaf's reasoning to
the Firearm Owners' Protection Act and holding that "willfully" means "undertaken in
violation of a known legal duty" within the context of 18 USC § 924(a). Id at *8. The decision was subsequently vacated and a rehearing en banc ordered. United States v
Langley, 1994 US App LEXIS 29385 (4th Cir).
8' See, for example, United States v Zehrbach, 1995 US App LEXIS 1304, *29 (3d Cir)
(en banc) (refusing to extend Ratzlaf to crime of bankruptcy fraud); United States v Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F3d 1040, 1048 n 21 (5th Cir 1994) (declining to apply Ratzlaf to a statute
that, unlike the antistructuring provisions, contains a willfulness requirement but not a
purpose requirement); United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1285 (9th Cir 1993), as
amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (refusing to extend Ratzlaf to a felony
violation of the Clean Water Act because Ratzlaf did not concern a "public welfare offense); United States v Santos, 20 F3d 280, 283 n 2 (7th Cir 1994) (declining to extend
Ratzlaf to a money laundering statute that lacked a willfulness requirement).
See, for example, Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F3d at 1048 n 21.
See, for example, Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d at 1285.
See, for example, Zimberg v United States, 142 F2d 132, 138 (1st Cir 1944).
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D. The Current Status of Mistake of Law
The cases described above indicate that the scope of the
mistake of law defense has broadened in the last ten years and
continues to broaden today. Whereas Cheek merely reaffirmed
the well-established tax crimes exception to the background rule,
Liparota,Ratzlaf, and recent lower court cases have created new
exceptions and based them on grounds different from those relied
upon in Murdock and Cheek. Even read narrowly, these cases
intersperse a variety of exceptions into the background rule. The
pattern to these exceptions, however, is not readily discernible.
Although the boundary of the tax crimes exception is definite,
neither Liparota nor Ratzlaf is clearly confined to its statute. On
the contrary, both decisions were justified at least in part by
reasoning that readily applies in other contexts.
It is thus difficult to delineate the collective scope of these
decisions. All involved mala prohibita crimes, and all involved
the interpretation of criminal statutes that could be described as
"regulatory.""7 In other words-notwithstanding the artificial
distinctions drawn by some courts-all of these cases involved
statutes criminalizing conduct that is not, as expressed in
Ratzlaf, "obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad.'""8 Beyond this starting point, however, the cases diverge. Ratzlaf, Curran,Obiechie,
and Rogers involved the interpretation of the single word "willfully" or one of its grammatical variants; Liparota did not.
Ratzlaf, Obiechie, and Rogers also involved statutes where a word
or phrase would have been superfluous if not interpreted to mandate a mistake of law defense; Liparota did not, and Curran
ignored the issue altogether. These problems are compounded by
the minority of cases that, for various reasons, have refused to
extend Ratzlaf's reasoning to other contexts.
Particularly unclear in the aftermath of Ratzlaf, Curran,
Obiechie, and Rogers is the meaning of willfulness. Although
these cases held that "willfully" means "with knowledge of illegality," a number of other cases in different statutory contexts have
held that it does not. 9 Ratzlaf itself acknowledged that the
' Of course, the extent to which this is true depends on what is meant by "regulatory." Although that term lacks a precise definition, "regulatory" offenses almost surely are
not limited to violations of rules promulgated by administrative agencies. Liparota, for
example, involved a statute that regulated food stamps, and Ratzlaf one that regulated
currency transactions. But because one could similarly describe almost any statute that
does not define a malum in se crime, "regulatory" may be nothing more than a synonym
for malum prohibitum.
Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 662.
See Note, An Analysis of the Term "Willful" in Federal CriminalStatutes, 51 Notre
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meaning of willfulness is variable and context dependent." Consequently, no clear rule emerges from these cases for determining
whether this term encompasses violation of a known legal duty.
Ratzlaf and its progeny do, however, create a precedential
framework in which mistake of law may be a viable defense in
certain circumstances. Given the extent to which the traditional
mistake of law rule is ingrained in our criminal law, it is understandable that courts will hesitate to follow the lead of cases such
as Curran and Obiechie, which read Ratzlaf broadly. Lower
courts will likely seek further Supreme Court guidance before
extending the mistake of law defense to the logical limits implied
by Liparota, Cheek, and Ratzlaf.1
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE
Although Ratzlaf and the other cases described above provide
precedential authority for expanding the mistake of law defense,
there are more fundamental reasons to include knowledge of
illegality as an element of certain crimes. This Part identifies the
theoretical underpinnings of the mistake of law defense and
provides a rationale for its expansion beyond the statutes described in Part I. Three issues are paramount: the role of the rule
of lenity, the importance of determining moral culpability, and
the implications of the constitutional requirement of due process.
A. Statutory Construction, Lenity, and Legality
1. Statutory construction and the problem of ambiguity.
Notwithstanding the background rule that mistake of law is
generally no excuse, Congress may of course decree that mistakes
of law will exculpate defendants in particular contexts. A few
criminal statutes do explicitly require proof of an intentional
violation of a known legal duty for conviction, and there is no
dispute regarding their interpretation." Conversely, where the
legislature is silent as to mistake of law and the statutory text is

Dame Law 786, 796-97 (1976).
See 114 S Ct at 659.
The Supreme Court is probably more favorably disposed toward the mistake of law
defense now than at the time Ratzlaf was decided. Justice Blackmun, one of the dissenters in Ratzlaf, has been replaced by Justice Breyer, who appears to be sympathetic to the
mistake of law defense. See United States v Aversa, 984 F2d 493, 502-03 (1st Cir 1993)
(Breyer concurring) (arguing that the Cheek standard should be applied to structuring).
See note 15.
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clear, it is safe to assume that the background rule remains applicable.93 But in cases where the statutory text makes the viability of mistake of law unclear, rules of statutory construction
will determine whether knowledge of illegality is an element of
the crime.
It is in these situations that Ratzlaf and its progeny expand
the mistake of law defense. From a textualist viewpoint, the
statutes interpreted in these cases fall into two general categories: in the first, the word "willfully" appears before a description
of the proscribed conduct;94 in the second, a mens rea term is
followed immediately by the word "violates" and language describing the provisions to which the criminal penalty attaches. 5
The precise meaning of willfulness was unclear long before
Ratzlaf was decided. 6 Compared to terms like "negligently" and
"purposefully," "willfully" has never been accorded a consistent
meaning.9 7 Although in the past "willfully" was most often construed to mean "knowingly and deliberately," rather than "with
awareness of illegality,"9 8 the awkwardness of this interpretation and the syntactic sleight of hand sometimes needed to reach
it have evoked open hostility from jurists and commentators.9 9
Inconsistency developed when a few courts began to hold that, in
certain statutes, willfulness requires the intentional violation of a

' Cheek, Ratzlaf, and the other cases expanding mistake of law in recent years have
all purported to retain the background rule, even as they created exceptions to it. See, for
example, Cheek, 498 US at 199; Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 663 ("We do not dishonor the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge.").
'4 See, for example, Curran, 20 F3d at 566 n 3, quoting 18 USC § 1001
("[w]hoever... knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up ... a material... shall be fined... or imprisoned").
" See, for example, Obiechie, 38 F3d at 311-12, quoting 18 USC § 924(a)(1)(D)
("whoever ... willfully violates any other provision of this chapter").
9" As the Supreme Court noted over fifty years before Ratzlaf, "willful" is inherently a
"word of many meanings," whose "construction [is] often... influenced by its context."
Spies v United States, 317 US 492, 497 (1943). See generally Note, 51 Notre Dame Law
786 (cited in note 89).
' Compare, for example, United States v Fierros,692 F2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir 1982)
(holding that provisions requiring willfulness "do not by their terms require knowledge
that the actions engaged in violate the statute"), with United States v Garcia, 751 F2d
1033, 1035 (9th Cir 1985) ("In a criminal statute, 'willfully' generally means a voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty in bad faith or with evil purpose.").
" See, for example, American Surety Co. of New York v Sullivan, 7 F2d 605, 606 (2d
Cir 1925); Zimberg v United States, 142 F2d 132, 137-38 (1st Cir 1944).
' When discussing how the Model Penal Code should treat the term, Judge Learned
Hand remarked, "[Willfully is] an awful word! It is one of the most troublesome words in
a statute that I know. If I were to have the index purged, 'willful' would lead all the rest
in spite of its being at the end of the alphabet." American Law Institute, Model Penal
Code and Commentaries § 2.02 n 47 (1985).
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known legal duty.' 0 But most courts, even when faced with alternate interpretations of the term, simply refused to infer that
Congress intended to create a mhistake of law defense with language such as "willfully violates."
Ratzlaf compounded this problem by interpreting "willfully"
more expansively and failing to explicitly limit its reasoning to
the antistructuring statutes. Cases like Curran and Obiechie,
which extended Ratzlaf's reasoning to other contexts, indicate
that Ratzlaf can be broadly applied to other statutes requiring a
mens rea of willfulness. Conversely, cases both before and after
Ratzlaf that have held that willfulness does not require knowledge of illegality still provide significant authority for courts
inclined to follow the more restrictive view. In the aftermath of
Ratzlaf, therefore, two very plausible interpretations of "willfully"
exist in federal criminal law: "knowingly and voluntarily," the old
interpretation, and "knowingly and voluntarily in violation of a
known legal duty," the new meaning.
But why should this analysis stop with the term "willfully"?
The Liparota Court posed a similar question and concluded that
the language ' owingly... in any manner not authorized" also
requires knowledge of illegality.' Although the mere presence
of the word "knowingly" does not automatically create ambiguity
in a statute, language such as "knowingly violates any provision
of this subchapter" is susceptible to more than one interpretation.
Indeed, the more literal and natural interpretation--even if not
the traditionally favored one-may be that awareness of the law
is required. In the proper statutory context, "knowingly violates"
is no less ambiguous than "willfully violates."
This is particularly true when failure to require knowledge of
illegality would render a mens rea term superfluous. That was
the case in Ratzlaf, for example, where on the dissent's view §
5322(a)'s willfulness requirement added nothing to § 5324's requirement that transactions be structured with the purpose of
evading the reporting requirements.0 2 Congress does not often
use redundant terms in criminal statutes, and courts must scrutinize language that at first blush appears unnecessary. 1 3 In
100 See, for example, Murdock, 290 US at 394-96; United States v Bishop, 412 US 346,
360 (1973); United States v Lizarraga-Lizarraga,541 F2d 826, 828 (9th Cir 1976).
101 See text accompanying notes 25-34. A federal district court in the Eleventh Circuit

recently reached the same conclusion when interpreting a statute that proscribes actions
performed "knowingly and willfully." See United States v Waters, 850 F Supp 1550, 156364 (N D Ala 1994).
2 Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 659.
" See, for example, PennsylvaniaDepartment of Public Welfare v Davenport,495 US
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acknowledging that "willfully" can have many meanings, and in
choosing the one that avoided surplusage, the Ratzlaf Court implied that this is the proper analysis.' Widely accepted rules
of statutory construction thus indicate that courts should read
statutes in a way that gives every term meaning, which usually
will lead to the conclusion that knowledge of illegality is required.
2. Lenity.
The rule of lenity's mandate to resolve "ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes" in the defendant's favor is applicable to statutes of the sort described above." 5 The interpretation of willfulness in a criminal statute bears directly on its
"ambit." In a case like Ratzlaf, for example, such interpretation
would determine the fate of a hypothetical defendant who purposely structured transactions but had no idea that structuring
transactions was illegal. Where there is significant doubt about
their meaning, therefore, statutory phrases such as "willfully
violates" or "knowingly violates" should be interpreted to require
knowledge of illegality.
Notwithstanding courts' frequent reluctance to employ the
rule of lenity, this application does not exceed the bounds of the
doctrine." 6 It is settled that lenity is only to be considered
where more conventional techniques of statutory construction fail
to clarify a statute's meaning. ' But as proposed here, the rule
would only be applied when the legislature has not only used a
term susceptible of multiple meanings, but has also failed to address the question of mistake of law. Similarly, the requirement
that lenity only be applied to statutes in which the ambiguity is

552, 562 (1990) ("Our cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so
as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment.").
" See 114 S Ct at 659 (noting that judges should resist treating statutory text as surplusage in any situation, particularly when that text describes the elements of a criminal
offense).
1o See Rewis v United States, 401 US 808, 812 (1971).
"0 See, for example, Chapman v United States, 500 US 453, 463 (1991). The rule was
used much more frequently in the nineteenth century than today. See Note, The Mercy of
Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev 197, 202
(1994). It may, however, be in the midst of a revival. See United States v Ray, 21 F3d
1134, 1140 (DC Cir 1994) (noting that recent Supreme Court decisions applying the rule
of lenity "do not seem to demand such a high level of uncertainty").
"0,See Russello v Un.ited States, 464 US 16, 29 (1983); Callananv United States, 364
US 587, 596 (1961); United States v Pollen, 978 F2d 78, 85 (3d Cir 1992), cert denied, 113
S Ct 2332 (1993).
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substantial poses no great difficulty: the degree of ambiguity
produced by uncertainty over whether knowledge of illegality is
an element of a crime will nearly always be sufficient to invoke
the rule. This proposed application of the rule is entirely consistent with the approach of the Ratzlaf Court.'
3. Legality and due process.
Equally applicable to mistake of law, and closely related to
the rule of lenity, is an even more fundamental tenet of criminal
law: the principle of legality, which requires that conduct must
be criminalized in order to be punishable."° It is implicit in the
principle of legality that if the state does not provide citizens
with at least constructive notice of what conduct is illegal, there
is no defensible basis for punishing the actor."0 Thus the principles of lenity and legality, according to Justice Holmes, are
based upon the idea that "fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.""'
Such notice is often absent when the text of a statute fails to
delineate clearly the elements of the offense it criminalizes. That
is obviously the case with provisions like § 5322(a) of the
antistructuring statutes, where the Supreme Court and ten federal courts of appeals disagreed about what the elements of the
crime were. The requirement of notice, therefore, dictates that
courts should read language like "knowingly violates" and "willfully violates" to require knowledge of illegality when it is unclear whether Congress intended such knowledge to be an element of the offense.
A final justification for a mistake of law defense lies in principles of due process, which argue for ends similar to those required by the doctrines of lenity and legality: notice by the state
of what conduct is criminal and limits on the discretion of law
enforcement agencies." And as with the rule of lenity and the
principle of legality, due process in this context carries with it
the force of a substantial body of precedent."'

"
"

See text accompanying notes 53-55.
See generally Herbert Packer, The Limits of the CriminalSanction 79-87 (Stanford,

1968).
110

1
112
11.

See Lambert v California,355 US 225, 228 (1957).
McBoyle v United States, 283 US 25, 27 (1931).
See Note, 86 Colum L Rev at 1403-04 (cited in note 29).
See, for example, Lambert, 355 US at 228-29 (requiring fair notice to convict some-

one for the "status crime" of being an unregistered felon); Papachristouv City of Jack-
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Due process requires that a defendant cannot be convicted
unless he had either actual subjective notice or a probability of
notice that his conduct was criminal.11 4 But because they
criminalize potentially innocent behavior, statutes defining mala
prohibita crimes sometimes cannot meet either standard. Unlike
sanctions for violations of mala in se statutes, punishment for a
malum prohibitum crime cannot be justified on the grounds that
the defendant's failure to know the law is in itself blameworthy.
Consequently, due process requires that mala prohibita statutes
clearly define the scope of conduct that they criminalize, leaving
no ambiguity as to whether knowledge of illegality is an element
of the crime.
In this sense, due process can be viewed as a stronger version of the rule of lenity, a kind of "constitutional lenity" that
only comes into play when statutes are egregiously ambiguous
and traditional notions of lenity have failed. For example, a law
criminalizing "contemptuous treatment" of the United States flag
violates this principle." 5 This is not to say that phrases such as
"willfully violates" taint every statute they touch with unconstitutional vagueness. But if due process protections are inapplicable
to these statutes, that may in itself be a reason to apply the rule
of lenity.
Standard principles of statutory construction and the rule of
lenity are thus the first line of defense to such statutes. Failing
that, mala prohibita statutes that are read not to require knowledge of illegality may potentially run afoul of due process concerns about ambiguity. Prior to Ratzlaf, for example, the
antistructuring statutes were broad enough to ensnare an individual who chose to make multiple bank deposits in amounts just
under $10,000, fearful that the transaction reports would fall into
the wrong hands and increase the chances of being burglarized."' Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion did not
specifically mention due process, instead relying on principles of
statutory construction and offering lenity as a possible alternative rationale. But Ratzlaf's use of the burglary example suggests

sonville, 405 US 156, 170-71 (1972) (holding that excessively vague laws are unconstitutional).
.. Lambert, 355 US at 229-30 (reversing conviction and noting that "[wihere a person
did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of
such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process").
' Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566, 572-73 (1974).
.. See Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 661.
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that such concerns were part of the Court's reasoning. The
Liparota Court made similar arguments." 7
B. Moral Culpability in Mala Prohibita Offenses
Before the advent of the Industrial Revolution some 150
years ago, the criminal law almost exclusively addressed conduct
that was malum in se. Convictions for criminal offenses generally
required proof of moral culpability, and the degree to which the
criminal law was intertwined with society's moral and religious
values made such proof a substantially lighter burden for the
prosecution than it would be today."' But the Industrial Revolution created pressure on legislatures to pass mala prohibita
regulations to protect citizens from the hazards of factory equipment, toxic chemicals, and other products of technological advancement."' Lawmakers frequently made the violation of
these regulations punishable as a criminal offense.
As the scope of penal law expanded, however, substantive
protections for defendants failed to keep pace. The notion that
every person is presumed to know the law gradually degenerated
from a normative and pseudopositive proposition into a purely
normative one, and an entirely unrealistic one at that. Although
Congress has expressly made mistake of law a defense to a few
scattered regulatory offenses, it is only in tax crimes that the
defense has been fully established.
That raises the question of why willfulness has been consistently read to include knowledge of illegality in the tax code but
not within other statutes. The logic of the tax crimes exception is
not so readily limited to the Internal Revenue Code as the Supreme Court has suggested. The exception's roots lie in the tax
code's Byzantine complexity, which makes it difficult for citizens
to understand their legal duties and obligations. ° Without a
knowledge-of-illegality requirement, violations of the tax laws

" See Liparota, 471 US at 426 (positing that without a knowledge-of-illegality requirement, the statute could ensnare a person who used food stamps "to purchase food
from a store that, unknown to him, charged higher than normal prices to food stamp
program participants").
11 See Hall and Seligman, 8 U Chi L Rev at 644-45 (cited in note 12). Because so few
offenses involved conduct that was morally innocent, the finder of fact was usually easily
convinced of moral culpability. Prosecutors could, for example, attempt to show such
moral culpability by pointing to education designed to inculcate moral values, concealment of the crime, and indications of regret. Even so, many crimes required proof not only
of moral culpability, but also of specific intent-knowledge of illegality. Id.
.19See Francis Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum L Rev 55, 68-69 (1933).
'20

Cheek, 498 US at 199-200.
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provide no assurance of the moral culpability on which punishment is normally based.12 '
In this way the tax code is analogous to other complex areas
of federal law, such as regulations governing securities or the
environment. The artificial line the Supreme Court has drawn
between tax and other offenses is better and more logically
placed between complex mala prohibita crimes and the remainder of the criminal code. If the reasoning behind the tax crimes
exception is taken seriously, mistake of law should thus be a
defense to other similarly complex mala prohibita offenses where
it has not been in the past, such as failing to pay employees one
and one-half times their normal rate for overtime, 1 2 storing hazardous waste materials with an incorrect permit,' and failing
to properly slope the sides of a trench in a pipe-laying excavation.'
On a more fundamental level, some interpretations of phrases like "willfully violates" and "knowingly violates" that do not
permit a mistake of law defense may be inherently flawed. Several cases have held that, in criminal statutes, "willfully" generally
means "done knowingly and with a bad purpose or evil motive,"
regardless of the defendant's knowledge of illegality.' This interpretation begs the question, insofar as our conception of what
is "evil" or "bad" is shaped at least in part by the legislature's
decision to criminalize the conduct at issue. An example is failure
to file tax returns, which was the basis for one of the charges in
Cheek. In what sense is failure to file a tax return ever "evil"?
Would anyone have considered such conduct evil in the nineteenth century, before the Sixteenth Amendment and the advent
of federal income taxation? Over time, as citizens became familiar with the federal income tax, they began to view the prohibited behavior as bad. 6 Eventually, there was no longer a logical
2

See Murdock, 290 US at 396-97.

See Nabob Oil Co. v United States, 190 F2d 478, 480 (10th Cir 1951) (affirming
conviction for failure to pay overtime and holding that willfulness is satisfied by the
defendant's acting deliberately, voluntarily, and intentionally).
". United States v Dee, 912 F2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir 1990) (affirming conviction for
knowingly handling hazardous waste without the appropriate permit).
124 United States v Dye Construction Co., 510 F2d 78, 81-82 (10th Cir 1975) (affirming
conviction for willfully failing to slope a trench). See also Stanley S. Arkin, 'Ratzlaf' and
the Meaning of Willfulness, NY L J 3 (Feb 10, 1994) (suggesting other possible applications of Ratzlaf).
12 See, for example, United States v Fierros,692 F2d 1291, 1294-95 (9th Cir 1982).
126 Although society's recognition of conduct as "bad" may lag behind the legislature's
'

criminalization of the conduct, commentators have recognized that the criminal law plays
a substantial role in shaping society's mores. See Hall and Seligman, 8 U Chi L Rev at
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leap involved in saying that purposely failing to file a tax return
is wrong, irrespective of knowledge of illegality. But trying to
make people know the law by enforcing it ignores the injustice
and social cost of punishing morally innocent defendants. And
even if everyone knows of a duty to file tax returns, failure to file
is still not "evil."
Unlike failure to file taxes, however, the great majority of
federal mala prohibita crimes may never come to be regarded as
criminalizing "bad" behavior. Indeed, with over three thousand
federal crimes on the books," most people will probably never
realize that much of the behavior in question is criminal at all. If
the words "willfully violates" or "knowingly violates" in a statute
that criminalizes such behavior necessarily mean "with bad purpose," they imply that a defendant must act with knowledge of
illegality to be guilty. Without such knowledge, the situation is
similar to that of tax crimes-there can be no certainty that the
defendant is morally culpable, and thus punishment should not
be imposed.'
III. A PROPOSAL REGARDING MISTAKES OF LAW
Lenity, moral culpability, and due process justify extending
the mistake of law defense beyond its current limits. This Part
offers a proposal for implementing such an extension in an effective and reasoned manner. Section A explains the proposal and
attempts to limit the applicability of the mistake of law defense
in three ways. First, the defense should be cognizable only for
offenses in which the statutory text has not explicitly foreclosed a
claim of mistake of law. Second, only those statutes requiring a
mens rea of recklessness or higher for violation should be interpreted to require knowledge of illegality. Third, a mistake of law
defense should only be available for mala prohibita offenses,
where the problems of absence of notice and lack of moral culpability are most prevalent. Section B presents three examples of

648 (cited in note 12).
"' See Timothy Lynch, Ignorance of the Law: Sometimes a Valid Defense, Legal Times
22 (Apr 4, 1994). This number includes both crimes that are mala prohibita, such as
counterfeiting, and crimes that are mala in se, such as intentionally killing a federal
poultry inspector.
"u The natural retort to this argument is that a legislative decision to criminalize
conduct represents the clearest possible reflection of a societal judgment on the culpability
of that conduct. But this response seems too simplistic and assumes a legislature that
perfectly represents and accurately mirrors our society. Our legislature does neither.
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how criminal statutes would be interpreted under this new approach.
A. Redefining and Limiting the Application of the Mistake of
Law Defense
The tremendous expansion of criminal law in the last hundred years has made it unrealistic to expect that people will
know the law, with the result that individuals may be convicted
for ostensibly innocent conduct that they had no idea was illegal.
Even if it were possible to know the penal code, the subtleties of
statuory interpretation would still blur the line between criminal
and noncriminal behavior. To resolve this problem, courts should
adopt a rule that, in the absence of a clear legislative command
to the contrary, mistake of law will be a defense to any malum
prohibitum crime that requires a mens rea of recklessness or
higher. This expansion of the mistake of law defense should not
be construed as a rejection of the background rule. Rather, courts
should strictly limit the application of mistake of law to those
circumstances in which it is necessary to address the concerns of
statutory interpretation, lenity, legality, and moral culpability.
The first proposed limitation on the mistake of law defense is
that it should only be available when the legislature has failed to
indicate clearly in the relevant statutory language its position on
mistake of law. Canons of statutory construction, the rule of
lenity, and the principle of legality should not be used to twist
the meaning of clear text. Instead, the proposed approach is designed to address only those situations in which the text of the
statute does not resolve whether mistake of law will exculpate.
Second, the defense should extend only to offenses for which
the mens rea required for violation is recklessness or higher. The
rationales underlying methods of statutory interpretation and the
rule of lenity are not equally applicable to every level of mens
rea. Language such as "willfully violates" and "knowingly violates" clearly call for the approach described here, but what of
other possibilities? "Purposely violates" implies awareness of a
legal duty to at least the same extent as "willfully violates" does.
"Recklessly violates" is somewhat more complex: it indicates that
the actor has a subjective awareness that some legal duty relevant to his conduct exists, but that he lacks a specific understanding of what that duty entails. A defendant who actually has
such a specific understanding violates the statute knowingly;
reckless violation, in contrast, might occur where the actor has
been informed that a particular activity is heavily regulated, but
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has not bothered to determine whether his actions are permissible. It follows that where a statute criminalizes reckless violations, the mistake of law defense would be available only to the
extent that the defendant could show that he was not aware of
any regulations relevant to his conduct at all.
When a statute punishes negligent violations, however, this
analysis changes. The reckless actor is subjectively aware of a
risk; the negligent one is not aware of the risk but should be.
Awareness of a legal duty will often lead to awareness of a risk,
but because the negligent defendant is by definition unaware of
the risk, in almost all cases he will also be unaware of the duty.
Thus, the imposition of a knowledge-of-illegality requirement in
offenses with a mens rea of negligence requires the government
to prove the defendant was aware of a legal duty at a time where
he was, by definition, unaware of the risk that duty was designed
to address. Such a requirement is unrealistic and would exculpate the defendant in nearly every case where it was imposed.
Consequently, the mistake of law defense cannot logically be
extended to offenses requiring negligence as the mens rea for
violation. Similar reasoning applies when the legislature has
explicitly imposed strict liability: if no awareness whatsoever of
the risk is required, it makes no sense to require awareness of a
legal duty before punishment can be imposed.
Statutory silence, in contrast, prompts a two-tiered analysis.
First, the statute must be scrutinized to determine whether any
mens rea should be read into it. Although the decisions on this
issue are not uniform, courts generally read in a mens rea requirement only where the statute imposes a harsh penalty or is
based on a common law offense. 9 If some mens rea is read in,
it should determine the statute's treatment under the approach
proposed here. If instead the statute is construed as dispensing
with a mens rea requirement, then it is simply a strict liability
offense and should be treated accordingly.
The third limitation on this approach is to restrict its application to mala prohibita crimes. Despite problems associated with
classifying a few specific crimes, 3 ' the distinction between mala
prohibita and mala in se works well because their definitions

See Morissette v United States, 258 US 250 (1922).
Certain crimes, such as narcotics offenses, are difficult to classify in one of these
two categories, primarily because they proscribe conduct that was not criminal at the time
th? categories developed. The classification of these offenses could be left either to the
legislature, to clarify the statutory text, or to the judiciary, to analogize the problematic
crimes to one category or the other.
'3
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track notions of moral culpability and, to a lesser extent, due
process. Crimes that are "inherently and essentially evil" are
invariably immoral, 3 ' and tend to be well recognized by citizens. This recognition largely eliminates concerns of legality and
notice. Additionally, the social costs of allowing a mistake of law
defense to mala in se crimes may be unacceptably high.
Limiting this approach to mala prohibita crimes also addresses concerns of excessive deterrence. When knowledge of
illegality is not required for conviction, mala prohibita statutes
may deter lawful and socially valuable conduct.'32 The consequence of ambiguity in such statutes is that people avoid engaging in heavily regulated activities where they might inadvertently commit a crime. Although this may be acceptable for mala in
se offenses that criminalize morally repugnant and socially
worthless conduct, it is a serious problem for mala prohibita
offenses criminalizing conduct that has some degree of social
desirability. Although the criminalization of such conduct may
represent a legislative determination that the conduct is on balance socially undesirable, it does not mean that the conduct has
no social value whatsoever.'3 3 It is thus logical to restrict the
extension of the defense to mala prohibita offenses because it is
only in these offenses that overdeterrence of socially desirable behavior is a concern.
This approach therefore yields a three-part test for determining whether the mistake of law defense should be expanded to
cover particular situations: First, the statute defining the offense
must not address the question of whether mistake of law is a
viable defense. Second, the mens rea required for violation of the
statute must be recklessness or higher. Third, the statute must
define a malum prohibitum crime.
B. Examples of Application
1. Violation of federal fabrics regulations.
Federal regulation of textiles is one of the many areas in
which Congress has criminalized potentially morally innocent

...Black's Law Dictionary 959 (West, 6th ed 1990).
'" See, for example, United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1286-88 (9th Cir 1993)
(affirming conviction where defendants violated the Clean Water Act in an effort to
prevent the release of bacteria into a municipal water system).
"n In some antitrust offenses, for example, the judicial determination of guilt actually
involves an explicit weighing of social costs and benefits. See, for example, United States v
United States Gypsum Co., 438 US 422, 440-41 (1978).
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conduct. The Flammable Fabrics Act directs the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") to promulgate regulations regarding flammable fabrics, particularly those fabrics so flammable as to be dangerous when worn." Specifically, 15 USC §
1192 prohibits commercial transactions involving fabrics that fail
to meet the standards issued by the CPSC; 135 15 USC § 1197(b)
prohibits false guarantees regarding the flammability of particular fabrics.1 3 6 As with the antistructuring statutes in Ratzlaf, a
separate provision provides criminal penalties for violation of the
other provisions and specifies a mens rea. Under 15 USC § 1196,
anyone who "willfully violates" § 1192 or § 1197(b) may be punished by up to a $5,000 fine and a year in prison. 31 Although
there are few reported cases interpreting these provisions, it
appears that knowledge of illegality is not necessary for a willful
violation of § 1196.131 _
Under the approach proposed in this Comment, however, a
defendant would have to act with actual knowledge of the relevant regulations-that is, with knowledge of illegality-in order
to be criminally liable under 15 USC § 1196. This is true despite
the fact that, unlike the antistructuring statutes, the Flammable
Fabrics Act does not impose mens rea requirements of knowledge
in some places and willfulness in others. Nor are there problems
of the word "willfully" being rendered surplusage, or being interpreted inconsistently within the group of statutes at issue. These
factors do not affect the outcome because "willfully violates" can
be interpreted to require awareness of a legal duty and because §
1196 criminalizes ostensibly innocent conduct. Thus, under the
approach proposed here, violation of these regulations requires
knowledge of illegality because the crime is malum prohibitum,
the mens rea required for violation is willfulness, and Congress
has failed to indicate clearly in the statutory text whether such
knowledge is required.

" Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 USC § 1193 (1988 & Supp 1993). Many of the regulations and standards issued by the CPSC deal with children's sleepwear. See 16 CFR §§
1615.1 et seq (1994).
'
Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 USC § 1192 (1982).
Id § 1197(b) (1982).
'37 Id § 1196 (1982).
" See United States v Sun and Sand Imports, Ltd., Inc., 725 F2d 184, 187 & n 3 (2d
Cir 1984) (charging defendant with constructive notice of orders issued by the OPSO and
holding that 15 USc § 1196 is not void for vagueness).
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2. Securities crimes.
In contrast to the statute described above, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 would not be read to include a mistake of
law defense under the approach proposed here. Willful violation
of the 1934 Act or the rules associated with it is a federal crime,
generally punishable by up to ten years in prison and a fine of up
to $1,000,000.' Courts have consistently interpreted the "willfully violates" language of 15 USC § 78ff(a) not to require knowledge of illegality. 40 Section 78ff(a), however, provides a limited
"no knowledge" defense to securities crimes that allows defendants to avoid imprisonment if they can prove they had no
knowledge of the regulation they are accused of violating."
The willfulness requirement of § 78ff(a) is similar to the requirement imposed by 31 USC § 5322(a) in Ratzlaf, and many of the
securities crimes in question are mala prohibita. Nonetheless, because Congress has clearly expressed its intention through the
text of this statute that mistake of law should not fully exculpate
a defendant, the approach proposed in this Comment is inapplicable to this offense.
3. Violation of the Clean Water Act.
Under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), it is unlawful to discharge pollutants into navigable waters without the appropriate
permit from the federal government.'4 2 Criminal violations of
the CWA are classified by the mens rea required. Under 33 USC
§ 1319(c)(1), negligent violations of certain CWA provisions are
misdemeanors punishable by a fine of up to $25,000 for each day
that the violation occurred and up to a year in prison. A knowing
violation, in contrast, is declared by 33 USC § 1319(c)(2) to be a
felony punishable by a fine of up to $50,000 per day and up to

'" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 USC § 78ff(a) (Supp 1993). The bestknown offense covered by this statute is insider trading.
40 See United States v Dixon, 536 F2d 1388, 1397 (2d Cir 1976) (holding that the

government need not prove defendant's knowledge of the 1934 Act to secure conviction for
its violation); United States v Schwartz, 464 F2d 499, 509 (2d Cir 1972) (holding that 15
USC § 78ff(a) contemplates willful violation with no knowledge of the rule that was
violated).
.4115 USC § 78fta). Even if a defendant makes a showing of lack of knowledge he
avoids only imprisonment; the stigma of a felony conviction still attaches, and the defendant remains liable for fines and restitution. A true mistake of law "defense," in contrast,
would completely exculpate the defendant because it would require the government to
prove knowledge of illegality as an element of the offense.
1'
Clean Water Act, 33 USC § 1311(a) (1988).
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three years of imprisonment.'
Courts have interpreted the
"knowingly violates" language of this latter provision to mean
that the defendant need only have knowingly engaged in conduct
resulting in the discharge of pollutants; actual awareness of the
CWA requirements or the limitations of a particular permit is irrelevant.'

Under the proposed approach, mistake of law would be a
complete defense to violations of § 1319(c)(2). The mens rea required is knowledge, the offense is malum prohibitum, and the
statute criminalizes behavior that in some circumstances may-be
not only completely innocent but even socially desirable. 4 5 In
this sense, the discharge of pollutants presents a substantially
easier case than does the structuring of currency transactions
under Justice Ginsburg's "inevitably nefarious" standard.' As
with the Flammable Fabrics Act, Congress has failed to address
the mistake of law issue in the statutory text. Thus all three
prongs of the proposed test are met, and the "knowingly violates"
requirement of § 1319(c)(2) should be interpreted to include a
mistake of law defense.
The "negligently violates" language of § 1319(c)(1), on the
other hand, illustrates the need to restrict the mistake of law
defense to offenses with a mens rea of recklessness or higher.
Because negligence does not require an actual subjective awareness of a risk of harm, it makes no sense to read "negligently violates" as requiring knowledge of illegality. To do so would mean
that a defendant must know he is violating the law but need not
know he is creating a risk of harm. Thus, courts should not interpret § 1319(c)(1) to require a mistake of law defense.
CONCLUSION

In the last fifty years, legislatures have increasingly used
criminal law to regulate behavior that, though seemingly innocent and bereft of moral culpability, poses some danger to society.
Many of the statutes regulating such behavior punish those who
knowingly or willfully violate their provisions. When the legisla-

Id § 1319(c)(1)-(2) (1988 & Supp 1993).
See, for example, United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir 1993).
"4 In Weitzenhoff, for example, the defendant sewage treatment plant was under
contract to clean waste water of diseases and to discharge waste into the ocean. The
defendant was convicted of discharging more waste into the ocean than its permit allowed, even though this was ostensibly an effort to reduce the risk of water-borne bacteria. Id at 1294 (Kleinfeld dissenting).
"4 See Ratzlaf, 114 S Ct at 660-61.
'
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ture has not specified the meaning of the mens rea language in
such a statute, courts have little guidance as to whether
knowledge of illegality is an essential element of the offense.
Moreover, when these statutes are interpreted so as to foreclose a
mistake of law defense, the government risks punishing individuals who lack moral culpability, discourages citizens from engaging in conduct that is often lawful and socially productive, and
fails to provide citizens notice of what is permissible and what is
not. Courts should therefore resolve this ambiguity by ruling
that, in the absence of a clear legislative command to the contrary, mistake of law is a viable defense to any malum prohibiturn crime that requires a mens rea of recklessness or higher.

